另一种现代性批判:论涂尔干学派中个体性与社会性的关系

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另一种现代性批判:论涂尔干学派中个体性与社会性的关系

谢晶

【期刊名称】《复旦学报(社会科学版)》 【年(),期】2018(060)003

【摘 要】With regard to the relation between individuality and sociality, there is a widely shared opinion about Durkheimian sociology,which defines it as holism and social determinism,and thus believes that it denies necessarily the individuality of any member of any society. In this paper,the author tries to prove that the opinion in question is inaccurate. For this purpose,three main arguments of that opinion are examined,which are all related to Durkheim's own writings. 1) Holist sociology denies the individuality ontologically speaking. 2) It finds in objective functions the genuine explanations of social phenomena, and therefore denies that individual elements (for instance intentions) could be decisive for actions. 3) It considers the political project which is based on social contract impossible. These arguments rely on two implicit conceptual premises. 1) If sociality is to be understood in a realistic sense,it must be understood as an organism. 2) Individuality relies either on physical auto-sufficiency or on moral autonomy. Both of the premises restrict the concept

of"whole"and"individual". After giving account to the popular opinion,the author is to argue over its inaccuracy by showing how Durkheimian sociology has developed. First, Durkheim has made an important concept


out of"institution,"in the specific sense that he defined. It meets the requirement of the holism without falling into the organic approach, and it plays a central role in the Durkheimian sociology in broad sense.

Second,Mauss and Dumont have made important sociological categories out of"person"and"individual,"which subsequently prove to be specifically modern institutions. As a result, individuality no more appears to be in conflict with sociality,but turns out to be a specific way through which sociality is realized.%在个体性与社会性之关系的问题上,至今盛行着一种关于涂尔干学派的观点,它将涂尔干主义与总体主义及社会决定论画上等号,并进而认为涂尔干式的社会学家必然否认任何社会中任何成员的个体性.本文首先想要证明的是上述观点具有片面性.为此,有必要了解它建立在哪些理由之上.它们可以被归纳为三,并都能在涂尔干自己的文本中找到根据:1.总体主义的社会学从本体论上就不承认个体性;2.这样的社会学将客观的功能视为对社会现象的真正解释,因而也就否认个人因素(例如意向或者说目的理性)对行动的决定作用;3.这样的社会学将以契约为基础的现代性规划视为不可能的任务.这三个理由背后有两个概念性预设:1.社会性如果要在唯实论的意义上被理解,社会就应该被理解成一种有机体;2.个体性要么建立在物理意义的自足之上,要么建立在道德意义的自律之上.这两个前设其实是对于"总体""个体"概念的窄化.对上述观点做出澄清后,本文将用涂尔干主义发展的两个路径来证明它应该被摈弃的理由.第一个路径始于涂尔干本人对"机制"的定义.它符合总体主义的要求,但并不落入有机主义.它在之后的涂尔干主义社会本体论中占主导地位.第二个路径则是莫斯和杜蒙在此基础上所发展出的对于"人格""个体"的分,它们被呈现为现代人特有的机制,个体性因而也就不与社会性相冲突,而被证明是社会性的一种特殊的实现方式. 【总页数】8(P28-35)


【作 者】谢晶

【作者单位】复旦大学 哲学学院,上海 200433 【正文语种】 【相关文献】

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